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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, t 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 900448-CA 
v. t 
LARRY BEN GARCIA, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of distribution and/or 
arranging the distribution of a controlled substance, to wit, 
cocaine, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-8(1) (Supp. 1990). This Court has jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The only issue presented in this appeal is whether 
there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to sustain 
defendant's conviction for distribution and/or arranging to 
distribute cocaine? 
The standard of review for a sufficiency claim is 
whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to 
the jury verdict, is so inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt of 
defendant's guilt. State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 
1989); State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 903-04 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of any provisions, statutes or rules upon 
which the state relies is included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 9, 1990, defendant, Larry Ben Garcia, and his 
cousin, Robert Garcia, were charged with distribution and/or 
arranging to distribute a controlled substance, to wit, cocaine, 
a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(l)(b) (Supp. 1990) (R. 1). Subsequently, in May, 1990, the 
complaint was amended to include the offense of being a habitual 
criminal (R. 9). Prior to trial, Robert Garcia pled guilty to a 
felony charge of distribution (T. 137). 
On July 3, 1990, defendant's bifurcated jury trial 
commenced before the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor, Second Judicial 
District Court, Weber County, State of Utah (R. 27). On July 6, 
1990, the jury returned a verdict of guilty to the felony 
distribution charge (R. 30, 72). The jury then heard evidence 
regarding defendant being a habitual criminal and also returned a 
verdict of guilty to that offense (R. 30-31, 71). 
On July 16, 1990, defendant entered a guilty plea to a 
second felony charge of distribution of a controlled substance 
(Sentencing Transcript at 2). On the same day, defendant was 
sentenced in the instant case to the statutory term of one to 
fifteen years, which sentence was enhanced, under the habitual 
criminal provision, to five years to life (R. 32, 37). On the 
guilty plea count, he was sentenced to the statutory term of one 
to fifteen years to run concurrently with this sentence 
(Sentencing T. 2-3). 
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Defendant did not appeal from his guilty plea 
conviction but did file a notice of appeal in this case on August 
16, 1990 (R. 75). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Weber County Narcotics Strike Force had targeted 
Robert Garcia, defendant's cousin, as a potential source for the 
purchase of cocaine. Utilizing both a confidential informant and 
an undercover reserve police officer, the police had arranged to 
purchase cocaine from Robert Garcia in exchange for stolen 
clothing merchandise (T. 42). 
Tracy Ericson, the undercover officer utilized, has 
been a part-time reserve officer with the Ogden City Police 
Department since December, 1984. As such, she is POST-certified 
in the same manner as any police officer and may "act in the 
capacity of a police officer with most of the authority of a 
regular officer" (T. 14). She receives no compensation for her 
police work and usually works fifteen to twenty hours per week 
(T. 14). Usually she works in narcotics and has often worked in 
an undercover capacity (T. 15)• 
On March 30, 1990, Reserve Officer Ericson and the 
confidential informant went to Robert Garcia's residence at 2055 
Adams Street, Ogden, Utah (T.17, 19). They had expected to met 
Robert there. Instead, his cousin, defendant Larry Garcia, 
answered the door and told the informant that Robert was not 
there but, that they could come in the house and wait for him (T. 
19). 
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Officer Ericson and the informant went into the house 
and waited for Robert for twenty to thirty minutes (T. 21, 46). 
During that time, Ericson, the informant and defendant were 
seated in the dining room and a table. Defendant was seated next 
to Ericson and the room was fairly well lit" (T. 20-21). 
Periodically, the informant and defendant attempted to locate 
Robert by telephone (T. 20). When Robert could not be located, 
Ericson made up an excuse to leave the home so that she could 
confer with her police colleagues who were providing backup 
assistance (T. 21-22, 44-45, 66-68). 
Ericson and the informant met with the police about a 
block away from the residence. They decided to have the 
informant call the Adams Street residence to see if Robert had 
been located. She did and was informed by defendant that he had 
located Robert at Poncho's, a local restaurant and bar (T. 22-
23). 
Ericson and the informant drove back to Adams Street, 
picked up defendant and proceeded to Poncho's to get Robert (T. 
23). During the five minute drive to Poncho's, defendant sat on 
the driver's side of the back seat, Ericson sat on the passenger 
side of the front seat, and the informant drove (T. 23-24). At 
Poncho's, the informant and defendant went inside, got Robert, 
and all three returned to the vehicle (T. 24). 
The four then returned to Adams Street. On the way, 
Robert and Ericson discussed 
the price of the clothing and how much 
cocaine I [Ericson] could get for the 
merchandise. He [Robert Garcia] told me that 
I could have a gram and a half, and I told 
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him I wanted two grams because the property 
was worth over $300. And he said okay . . . 
(i tlley got to the Garcia residence, Robert took the 
bag of what Ericson had represented to be stolen clothing n• I 
went into the house with defendant 11 n , 1 v a 
gold wrHic urn. i i the cocaine was delivered (T. 25). 
After a few minutes, defendant returned to the vehicle 
and handed Ericson a " litt.lo baggy of i ;hite powdery substance" 
(T. 26), Defendant told her that Robert was in the house making 
up another baggy to exchange for the watch (T. 27) ri - t. -
defendant the watch and he returned lu the house. A :ew minutes 
later, both defendant and Robert came out of the house and gave 
Ericson the second baggy (T. 28). Defendant then returned to the 
house and Ericson and the Informant drove Robert back to Poncho's 
(T. 28). 
Ericson and the informant immediately rendezvoused with 
the backup officers and Ericson handed over the baggies (T. 29). 
The contents of the baggies were subsequently chemically tested 
and determined to be cocaine (T. 93-103). 
. Defendant presented one witness en -is ow;. behalf, 
Oscar Gonzales (T. 116). Oscar testified that n March 30th, 
Robert and defendant were at a pool tournan>^ .0-12 1). 
Originally, UP had nui remembered what day of the week the 
tournament was, but claimed he was sure it was the 30th. 
In rebuttal, the state call eci Robert, Garcia, who . 
corroborateil1 officer Ericson's recollection of the drug 
transaction. Robert testified that some time in late Mar "• 
early April, he and defendant had exchanged cocaine for what they 
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thought to be stolen clothes (T. 137-139). He also stated that 
around the same time, but not the same day, he and defendant had 
played in a pool tournament with Oscar Gonzales (T. 141-142). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Based on the evidence presented at trial, together with 
all reasonable inferences, there is sufficient evidence to 
sustain defendant's conviction for distribution and/or arranging 
to distribute a controlled substance, to wit, cocaine. 
ARGUMENT 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL TOGETHER WITH 
ALL REASONABLE INFERENCES IS SUFFICIENT TO 
SUSTAIN DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR 
DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
Defendant's sole argument raised on appeal is that the 
evidence presented at trial is insufficient to sustain his 
conviction for distribution of a controlled substance, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (Supp 1990), which 
reads, in pertinent part: 
[l](a) Except as authorized by this chapter, 
it is unlawful for any person to knowingly 
and intentionally: 
(ii) distribute a controlled or 
counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute 
a controlled or counterfeit substance[.] 
• • • 
(b) Any person convicted of violating 
Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I 
or II is guilty of a second degree 
felonyf.] 
In making this argument, defendant does not attack the 
admission of any evidence, the instructions to the jury, or any 
ruling of the court. Instead, it is limited to whether or not 
the jury should have believed Officer Ericson and Robert Garcia 
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when they testified that defendant had aided noberi in 
il i isti J hut i ij f IK cocaine. 
The standard for review of a sufficiency of evidence 
challenge is well-established by i.h* • appellate courts, As 
defendant concedes, the evidence must t viewed in the light most 
favorable to the jury verdict and will only be deemed 
insufficient when the verdict "is suffi ciently inconclusive or ; 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of 
which < wa& convicted." State v. Johnson, 1 7 4 P. 2d 1 141 , 1147 
(Utah 1989), Accord State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 903-04 (Utah 
App. Ct. 1990).. It is not the appellate court's duty to wei.gh 
conflicting evidence or tl le credibility of witnesses. An 
appellate court "does not have the prerogative to substitute its 
judgment on the credibility of witnesses for that of the fact-
finder." State v. Hopkins, 782 P. ? i 5 " 47 7 (Utah 1989). 
Accord State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, > (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
(citing State v. Booker, 709 P.2d J><*Z, (lit ah 1985)). 
Unless the prosecution's account of the facts appears 
to be so lacking and insubstantial that the jury must necessarily 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that ihe ciefendant committed 
the ci' ime charged, d reviewing court is obligated to assume the 
jury believed the evidence which supports th€^  jury verdict. 
State v. Brooks, 631 P. 2d 878, 884 (Utah I'9111"! A conviction 
wi ] 1 not be overturi led merely because the jury chose to 
disbelieve the defendant's evidence. State v. Jonas , 7 93 P. ?d at: 
905; State v Lacto< •. • 7. 
-7-
The deference given to the jury verdict compels the 
requirement that when a sufficiency of the evidence argument is 
made on appeal, an appellant must "marshal all the evidence" in 
support of the jury verdict and then "demonstrate that even 
viewing it in the light most favorable" to the verdict, the 
evidence is insufficient. State v. Moore, 147 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 
32 (Utah Ct. App. Nov. 8, 1990). Where an appellant fails to 
marshal the evidence, he has waived review of the sufficiency 
claim. Id. 
Here, defendant argues that Officer Ericson must have 
been mistaken in her identification of defendant since Oscar 
Gonzales testified that he was with defendant on the night of 
March 30th. In effect, defendant is simply "urgfing] essentially 
the same points raised at trial." State v. Moore, 147 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 32. As such, he has failed to adequately marshal the 
evidence as required for appellate review. 
Even if this Court addressed defendant's claim on the 
merits, the evidence amply supports the jury verdict. A police 
officer identified defendant as being one of two individuals 
involved in a hand-to-hand sale of cocaine occurring on March 
30th. Defendant refuted that the incident took place on the 30th 
through Oscar Gonzales, who testified that on that date he was 
with defendant. The codefendant, Robert Garcia, reconciled any 
conflict when he testified that both incidents had occurred. He 
and defendant had sold cocaine to Officer Ericson as described 
and, he and defendant had played in a pool tournament with Oscar 
Gonzales. Both events took place around the same period, the end 
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of March or beginning of April, but he was unsure of the date of 
either. 
Any conflict as to the exact date of the crime was not 
material to its proof. Based on the totality of the evidence, 
together with all reasonable inferences, the jury had 
overwhelming support for their conclusion that defendant 
distributed and/or arranged the distribution of cocaine "on or 
about" March 30, 1990. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction for 
distribution of and/or arranging to distribute a controlled 
substance should be affirmed. v^^^^ 
DATED this ^ t ~ day of <L^ece vA\^ loe-v , 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
^CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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